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COMPREHENSIVE PRODUCTION PLAN FOR NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE ON THE FAR EAST

INTRODUCTION

This plan represents an initial statement of United States National intelligence production requirements on the Far East. Insofar as it is possible to identify total requirements, such a statement can serve as a comprehensive guide. By means of this guide, intelligence agencies can formulate individual and coordinated production programs leading to its fulfillment. The scope of this paper is not restricted by existing production capabilities of United States Government intelligence agencies, nor by present availability of source material; neither can its full implementation be achieved within any brief period of time. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the dissemination, discussion, and periodic revision of this comprehensive intelligence plan will lead to an integrated production effort by all United States Government agencies concerned with the production of intelligence on the Far East.

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In addition, this program furnishes broad guidance for determining intelligence collection requirements. The flow of intelligence from the field thereby can be synchronized with the needs of the producing components of intelligence agencies.

CONCEPT

The perspective within which the Far East is related to United States security interests is a world setting within which the general objective of United States intelligence is discernment of the role which the Far East is assuming, and is likely to assume, in the development of the world situation. From this perspective there has developed a concept for production of national intelligence on the Far East. Essential portions of this concept are quoted below from a recent staff study to the NSC:

"2. b. Significance of the Far East

The Far East is a region of large material and human resources possibly capable of being controlled and organized by an unfriendly power in such manner as to pose a crucial threat to the security of the United States. This possibility was recognized by Japan and planned in terms of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It is probable that Czarist Russia long recognized, and is almost certain that the USSR now does recognize this possibility. Should the Far East region be eventually harnessed by the Soviet Union and employed in coordination with its Eurasian potentials, the United States would be confronted with a possibly decisive

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disadvantage either in armed conflict or in a prolonged struggle on terms short of war. From the standpoint of United States security it is therefore essential to determine what measures are and can be applied by any power to gain control of the Far East, and what is the nature of the potentials to be controlled.

c. Control in the Far East

Most of the Far East is in a state of major political, social, and economic transition. Attendant disarrangements have permitted the growth of a general susceptibility to manipulation on the part of the region's predominantly illiterate and unsophisticated populations, subject to deprivation and uncertainty, and desirous of improving their conditions. There is, moreover, the particular susceptibility of those abler individuals who, released by the weakening of customary social mechanisms, seek expression, status, and power, and frequently identify their aims with nationalistic or progressive goals. Taking full advantage of these circumstances is a vigorous international communism admittedly devoted to acquiring domination of the Far East as part of its objective of world domination. The dynamic nature of communism, its ability to exploit professedly nationalist movements, the constantly shrinking portions of the Far East not under its power, and the difficulty of retrieving, by Western democratic methods,

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any area once lost to it, all indicate the importance of estimating the remaining prospects for increasing or lessening control in the Far East by either side in the US/USSR struggle.

d. Potentials of the Far East

An assessment of the human and material potentials of the Far East is of continuing moment to whomever may hope to achieve a position of influence or control over all or parts of that region. On the basis of an enduring world struggle between the United States and the USSR, on terms short of war, the respective contenders must recognize and strive to attain, within whatever limitations their principles impose, those elements of human and material power in the Far East which will ultimately help to weigh a world balance in their favor. Since, however, the threat of war always exists, it is more urgent to take immediate and continuing stock of existing potentials for participation in war by all or parts of the Far East. Of particular importance to United States Security in this respect is the question of the growth in the Far East of a comprehensive war-making complex independent from, but in support of other centers of Soviet power."

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THE PLAN

From the foregoing concept and from analysis of factors and trends during the past year, the following principal considerations, from a standpoint of national security, have been determined as essential in governing the planning and production of national intelligence on the Far East:

a. Possibilities for control in the Far East, to include:

(1) Vulnerability of the Far East, area by area, to control unfavorable to the United States.

(2) Capabilities for the acquisition, exercise, and denial of control in the Far East by parties to the US/USSR struggle.

b. Potentialities of the Far East in War and Peace,

including:

(1) Investigation of the possibility of the formation of a comprehensive war-making complex in the Far East, independent from, but in support of other centers of Soviet power.

(2) Concurrent and continuing assessment of the existence or emergence in the Far East of elements of power employable by the major contenders in a protracted world struggle on terms less than war.

Based upon the above considerations, comprehensive analysis of national intelligence for the Far East requires a multiple approach.

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This approach involves examination of political, military, economic and other forces in the region as a whole and its sub-regional segments to identify the significance of these areas and of developments within them as they appear in a regional perspective.

GEOGRAPHICAL SCOPE

Comprehensive intelligence estimates required by conditions and developments centering in the Far East and of strategic significance to the United States, preclude a definitive, exclusive geographical definition of "the Far East." In general, however, concern for the possible potential for self-sufficiency in the Far East, and for broad military, economic and political considerations, requires attention to the areas between 60° East and the International Date Line (excluding those portions of the USSR lying west of 100° East). Some considerations might even require concern for a larger area, and many for a smaller one.

This type of area coverage is dictated specifically by the need to consider particularly the economic potential of eastern Siberia and the industrial and military potential of South Asia, insofar as these may be essential to strategic evaluation of the Far East region. The need to consider eastern Siberia in forming a strategic evaluation of the Far East does not preclude consideration of this area in


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estimates concerned primarily with the rest of the USSR; nor does the need to consider South Asia with the Far East exclude need to consider this area with the Middle East. Likewise, concern for conditions and developments centering in the Middle East or the USSR may require attention to pertinent factors in the Far East. The end result of this type of approach for all regions of the world should be an integrated estimate of the United States global security position.

BASIS FOR SUB-REGIONAL GROUPINGS

For purposes of analysis the countries of the Far East must be arranged in various sub-regional groupings. These are determined by the implications for the individual areas of vulnerability (see Appendix A-1), political orientation (see Appendix A-2) and the potentials for economic integration (see Appendix B).

Appendix A-1 is essentially an assessment of vulnerability of the Far East to control unfriendly to the United States based on analysis according to tentative strategic groupings of countries and 25X6A within the Far Eastern region. 25X6A-RDP79-01082A0002001000



Appendix A-2 is devoted primarily to consideration of internal and external political intelligence estimates. The common denominator in this field of investigation is political orientation.

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Appendix B has other area groupings as the basis for development of specific area and regional projects. These area groupings are developed according to preliminary estimate of their actual or potential economic integration and to assumptions (or conclusions) regarding vulnerability of particular countries to unfriendly control (Appendix A-1) and the prospects of control in particular countries as indicated by their political orientation - (Appendix A-2). Thus, one area groupings in Appendix B examines actual and potential integration of the Soviet Far East with China (including Manchuria) and northern

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United States policy for the Far East currently is being re-examined from the perspective of the region as a whole and its relation to United States security. Analysis of the pertinent problems involving United States security in each country requires examination in a regional context. It is believed that the groupings described above will, in the final analysis, permit comprehensive assessment of the region and the countries within the region which is necessary to evaluation of the interests and problems affecting United States national security in the Far East.

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Types of Estimates:

The above major spheres of investigation suggest four general types of intelligence estimates:

(1) Comprehensive Estimates for the Region

(An assessment of relationships of multiple factors in their regional significance - Illustrations: "Strategic Importance of the Far East" - ORE 17-49; "Implications for United States Security of Developments in Asia" - IM-197.)

(2) Comprehensive Estimates for a Selected Area or Country

(An assessment of multiple factors within a selected area or country with due consideration for regional as well as area significance - Illustrations: "Probable Developments in China" - ORE 45-49; "Vulnerability of a Communist Government of China to External and Internal Pressures" - ORE 72-49).

(3) Regional Special Estimates

(An assessment of a single factor in a regional perspective - Illustration: "Vulnerabilities of Communist Movements in the Far East", IM-209.)

(4) Area Special Estimates

(An exhaustive analysis confined to a single subject within a single area or country, as typically performed by basic research units within the IAC Agencies.)

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FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

In general accord with the concept for national intelligence on the Far East, individual fields of investigation are set forth in Appendices under the following major headings:

Appendix A: Possibilities for Control in the Far East

(A)-1. Vulnerability of areas in the Far East to control unfriendly to the United States.

(A)-2. Capabilities for exercising and denying control of the Far East

Appendix B: Potentialities of the Far East in a war situation.

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APPENDIX A

(In two Parts)

POSSIBILITIES FOR CONTROL IN THE FAR EAST

Introduction

In the long run the magnitude of the Far East's strategic significance to United States national security rests in the degree to which the major components of the region may comprise a self-contained war potential capable of being brought under control of a power unfriendly to the United States. Insofar as this control permits development and exploitation of such a war potential, the consequence could be critical and decisive in any conflict involving the United States. (Cf. ORE 17-49). The pre-eminent objective of Soviet policy is world domination. Pursuant to this end, the USSR now is believed to be employing all available social tactics and power pressures, including strategic deployment of Soviet forces and use in combat of indigenous armed forces, to manipulate and maneuver into control of all of the Far East. Consequent to existence of this objective and to the significance that would attend Soviet success in the Far East, it becomes essential to determine extent of the prospects for friendly and unfriendly control of the Far East and to identify forces whereby prospects for control by the USSR can be decreased and control denied.

It is proposed to estimate the prospects for control of the Far East, friendly to the United States or those favoring the USSR, by two general approaches to the problem: (a) an area by area examination of vulnerabilities to forces of unfriendly control (covering political, economic, sociological,

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psychological and military considerations) with particular regard for interdependence of the sub-regional areas in resisting such control; and (b) a regional examination of the forces of control (friendly or unfriendly to the United States) that are available and that may become available within the region. While the approach involved in an assessment of vulnerabilities under (a) is apparently negative, it is, nevertheless considered sound because a true assessment of vulnerabilities will suggest feasible positive measures for reducing the vulnerabilities or for exploiting factors of strength or invulnerability. This concerted application of two approaches to determination of prospects for control i.e., through (a) vulnerabilities and (b) capabilities for exploiting vulnerabilities frequently involves concern for identical factors in both approaches; but methods of employing these factors in developing assessments vary in accord with the type of approach.

Both approaches take cognizance of the fact of incompatible differences in objectives and methods of the Soviet government and the United States which tend to impose severe limitations on the measures and counter-measures available to the United States.

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APPENDIX A-1

VULNERABILITY OF AREAS IN THE FAR EAST TO CONTROL UNFRIENDLY TO THE US.

The concept of "unfriendly control" herein is a control that favors the USSR. Actual Soviet control might vary in nature and in degree from effective indirect influence to military occupation or outright incorporation. In whatever degree the control of an area were unfriendly to the US it is apparent that the USSR endeavors to exploit such control for its own purposes.

In extending its control or influence over areas of the Far East, the USSR can be observed to employ the following general types of measures, separately and in combination:

(1) Political, sociological, and psychological.

Exploitation and perversion of nationalistic ambitions and of internal frictions growing out of legitimate or fabricated and induced economic and political grievances.


(2) Economic.

Penetration, pressure and control.

(3) Armed force

Employment or threatened use of military or unconventional armed force by Soviet or indigenous Communist troops or personnel.

In a period not involving hostilities between the US and the USSR, expected emphasis would be on (1) and (2), above, but not to exclusion of (3) as it involves use of non-Soviet indigenous armed forces. Under conditions of general hostilities involving forces of the US and USSR the emphasis would be on (3), supplemented by (1) and (2). It must be recognized, however, that, in effect, even now the USSR is employing armed forces to obtain its objectives, even though the preponderance of such forces is non-Russian indigenous forces, occasionally given inducement or moral support by the threat or encouragement resulting from the proximity of Soviet armed force.



For assessment of the vulnerability of each strategic area, one or several general intelligence investigations may be involved according to the complexity of the subject and depending on the availability of timely studies. Moreover, the following list of general fields of investigations is only tentative. Each suggested field necessarily will be subjected to more detailed analysis as the production programs progress. It is likely that such analysis in the light of intervening developments will require revision of the list.

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Vulnerability of China and Korea to extension and consolidation of Communist control.

Problem: To assess the prospects for extension and consolidation of Communist control in China and Korea.

Scope: An assessment of the Soviet and non-Soviet Communist capabilities for extending and consolidating Communist control in the sub-regional mainland area of China and Korea in relation to non-Communist vulnerabilities, taking into account the political, economic, sociological, psychological and military strengths and weaknesses of opposing groups. A summation of subsidiary country assessments available or in process of production.

2. Vulnerability of the "Offshore Island Chain" to expansion of Soviet influence or control.

Problem: To assess the vulnerability of the offshore island chain to direct or indirect Communist penetration.

Scope: Assessments of the vulnerability of this strategic area to Soviet measures of control short of war and, alternatively, in a war situation should be made under varying assumed conditions of US and Soviet influence or control in adjacent areas listed below, and would be based on similar assessments of the individual components of the island chain. Alternative assumptions under which assessments should be made are:

(a) Continuation of the cold war under the following conditions:

- (1) Status quo continues in all adjoining areas except for effective consolidation of Communist control in China.
- (2) Southern Korea comes under Communist domination and strong Soviet influence; all of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan come under CCP control. Strong Communist trend in SEA and steady weakening of Western powers position in that area.

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(b) An active war under conditions (a) (1) and (2), above.



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c. Vulnerability of the Philippines to Soviet expansion.

Problem: To assess the vulnerability of the Philippines to direct and indirect Soviet penetration.

Scope: The assessment should cover vulnerabilities both prior to and after an assumed outbreak of US-USSR hostilities, and should have due regard for all measures of penetration available to the USSR. Each of the following assumed situations should be covered specifically:

- (1) Independence of southern Korea maintained, Japan and the Ryukyus still under US occupation, Taiwan under non-Communist Chinese control, and Hong Kong still under effective British control up to the outbreak of hostilities; and
- (2) Southern Korea and Japan under Communist domination and aligned with the USSR; China, Hong Kong and Taiwan under firm CCP control, with free Soviet military and economic access thereto. In addition the assessment should consider the effect on the conclusions in situation (2) of:
 - (a) ascendancy of Soviet influence in
 - i. Burma, Thailand, Indochina
 - ii. Indonesia-Malays, as well, and
 - (b) US withdrawal from the Ryukyus.

3. Vulnerability of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina to Soviet expansion.

Problem: To assess the vulnerability of this principal food surplus area to direct or indirect Soviet penetration.

Scope: Assessment should cover vulnerabilities of this sub-regional area to all measures of Soviet penetration both in an extension of the cold war and in a period of general active hostilities involving the US and USSR under each of the following assumed situations existing prior to or at the outbreak of such hostilities.

- a. China comes under early CCP consolidated control; the status quo is maintained in Hong Kong, southern Korea and the offshore island chain, established authority in Burma and Indochina remains in tenuous control.
- b. Same as a, above, except that southern Korea comes under Communist domination, CCP control extends over Hong Kong and Taiwan, US occupation forces are withdrawn from Japan pursuant to a peace

treaty by the end of 1950, but the present degree of US influence in the Ryukyus and the Philippines is maintained.

- c. All US influence in China and Korea and the offshore island chain is eliminated.

The need for separate country studies would depend on assessment of available material.

4. Vulnerability of Malaya and the East Indies (east to 127° E) to Soviet expansion.

Problem: To assess the vulnerability of the Asiatic source of essential strategic materials to direct or indirect Soviet penetration.

Scope: Assessment should cover vulnerabilities to all measures of Soviet penetration under each set of assumed conditions listed below and should have particular regard for the effect on US accessibility to the essential materials of the region. Alternative assumptions under which assessment should be made are:

- a. In a continued "cold war" with present US control maintained in the offshore island chain, China under consolidated CCP control, growing instability or growing Communist influence in Burma, Thailand, and Indochina, and continuation of the present situation in Malaya, Indonesia, and South Asia.
- b. Following an outbreak of US-USSR hostilities with all China under consolidated Communist control, the US eliminated from Japan, US bases maintained in the Ryukyus and the Philippines increased instability or unfriendly control in Burma, Thailand and Indochina, and continuation of present situation in South Asia.
- c. Same as a and b, above, except for significant increase of Soviet influence or control in South Asia.

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b. Soviet control of, or predominant influence in all eastern Asia.

6. Vulnerability of the Western Pacific north of the equator.

Problem: To assess the vulnerability of the Western Pacific (north of the equator) to Soviet penetration.

Scope: Assessment should cover vulnerabilities in time of US-USSR hostilities only, but should include consideration of all measures of Soviet penetration. Specific areas covered should exclude the Asian offshore island chain and the Aleutian Islands. Assessment should cover the following assumed situation:

- a. Firm non-Communist control of the Asian offshore island chain and the Aleutians;
- b. Continued non-Communist control of the Asian offshore island chain but US control of the Aleutians eliminated; and
- c. Soviet control of both the Asian offshore island chain and the Aleutians.

7. Vulnerability of South Asia

Problem: To assess the vulnerability of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Afghanistan) to Soviet penetration.

Scope: Assessment should cover vulnerabilities to all measures of Soviet penetration both in a continuation of the present "cold war" and in a situation of open US-USSR hostilities under each of the following assumptions:

- a. Strong Soviet influence in eastern Asia not appreciably expanded beyond present limits.
- b. Strong Soviet influence or control established throughout China (including Taiwan), and in Indochina, Thailand and Burma.
- c. Western control substantially eliminated from the mainland of eastern Asia and the major offshore islands including Indonesia.

CAPABILITIES FOR EXERCISING AND DENYING CONTROL OF THE FAR EAST

Any of four general conditions affecting the US security position in Asia is possible under complete or partial control by a power or powers friendly or unfriendly to the US, depending on the degree of control and the political orientation of the controlling force ---

- (1) Capability for independent, direct offensive threat to US national security, based on a self-sufficient war-making complex, consequent to complete control of the Far East by a power unfriendly to the US and its marshalling of the Far East's war potential. (It is estimated that only the USSR has a capability for realizing this potential within the practical future. Basis for estimate of the probability of Soviet realization of this potential is provided in Group I, below.)
- (2) Positive denial to the US of elements of major strategic interest without posing a capability for independent, offensive action against US national security, consequent to limited control by a power or powers unfriendly to the US. (Only the USSR and/or China is capable of creating this condition which is less critical than that under (1) above. Basis for estimate of the degree of attainment of this condition is provided in Group II, below.)
- (3) Incidental denial to the US, and to both friendly and unfriendly powers, of elements of strategic advantage, consequent to conditions of instability. (Group III, below).
- (4) Positive availability to the US and denial to powers unfriendly to the US of elements of strategic interests, consequent to maintenance of stability and development of the will and ability for individual coordinated opposition to Communism in Far Eastern areas. (Group IV).

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The approach to determination of the potential for control and denial depends partly on political orientation of the areas. Because the strategy and problems of expanding Communism differ with the general political orientation of various countries, but are relatively similar in countries of similar orientation, the countries of the Far East are grouped in three political groupings for purposes of setting up these fields of investigation. These areas have been grouped according to estimate of political orientation up to 31 December 1952 or at the prior outbreak of hostilities (according to ORE 17-49):

- (1) Areas oriented towards the USSR: China and northern Korea. (Area A).
- (2) Areas oriented towards the US: all of the independent and common-wealth nations (except China and Burma). (Area B).
- (3) Areas of mixed orientation: Burma and all of the colonial areas. (Area C).

It is estimated that the USSR, possibly with the instrument of China, is the only power unfriendly to the US possessing any potential for bringing the war-potential of the Far East under single, centralized control. Consequently, intelligence production designed to determine "Capabilities for exercising and denying control in the Far East" can be focused on two principal strategic considerations --

- (1) policies, objectives and capabilities of Communism (Soviet and indigenous).
- (2) limitations restricting attainment of these objectives.

Proceeding with this approach, the following investigations should be conducted, leading to: (a) determination of the prospects for unfriendly and friendly control of the Far East as this control may produce any of the four conditions outlined above, and (b) identification of forces whereby prospects for unfriendly control can be decreased and prospects for incidental denial to the US of strategic advantages can be minimized.

GROUP I

PROSPECTS FOR USSR CONTROL OF ALL OR PART OF THE FAR EASTERN REGION, AND
IMPLICATIONS THEREOF.

AREA A - Areas oriented toward the USSR (China and northern Korea).

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Soviet policies, objectives and capabilities

a. Subject - Soviet objectives and policies in China.

Problem - To identify Soviet objectives and policies for attaining those objectives in China.

Scope - This area of investigation is directed at analyzing Soviet political, economic, and military aims, tactics and strategy in China, including consideration of methods and pressures employed, intent towards political, economic and military integration of the area with the Soviet Far East, strategy in employment of China as an instrument of Communist expansion throughout the Far East, and distinctions in Soviet intent in China proper and in the areas of Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang that separate China proper from the USSR.

b. Subject - Soviet objectives and policies in Korea

Problem - To identify Soviet objectives and policies for attaining those objectives in Korea.

Scope - Analysis aimed at assessing the nature and degree of actual and probable political, economic, psychological and military pressures exerted by the USSR on these several areas, and the effectiveness and significance of those pressures in achieving Soviet control of the northeast Asian complex as a self-contained, direct offensive threat on US national security. Concern should be given to the distinction between control that enhances Soviet ability to pose an offensive threat to the US and control that merely denies to the US access to strategic materials of the area.

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- c. Subject - Soviet capabilities for attaining effective control of (a) China Proper, (b) Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, and (c) Korea.

Problem - To estimate the degree to which the USSR is and may be able to gain effective control of these portions of Northeast Asia.

Scope - Analysis aimed at assessing the nature and degree of actual and probable political, economic, psychological and military pressures exerted by the USSR on these several areas, and the effectiveness and significance of those pressures in achieving Soviet control of the Northeast Asian complex as a self-contained direct offensive threat on US national security. Concern should be given to the distinction between control that enhances Soviet ability to pose an offensive threat to the US and control that merely denies to the US access to strategic materials of the area.

2. Limitations on Soviet expansion

- a. Subject - Inherent limiting factors in Soviet expansion

Problem - To identify and assess the force of inherent factors limiting pursuit of identifiable Soviet objectives.

Scope - This field will be explored by several studies designed to identify and evaluate the force and effectiveness of factors that inherently impede both Soviet and native Communism's progress in gaining control and effective consolidation of China and Korea as parts of the northeast Asian complex. Particular concern should be given to - problems that confront the USSR in its endeavor to gain practical, though not apparent, subservience of Communist China; effect of economic inadequacies and dependence as elements denying or retarding Soviet development of political, economic and military integration of a self-sufficient Far Eastern complex; administrative and technical inadequacies; factionalism; forces of moderation (particularly political, sociological and psychological that may produce a moderating or obstructionist effect upon executive plans for Communization of the areas within the northeast Asia complex; and resistance movements and organizations (armed or otherwise).

- b. Subject - Potentials of US strength for active opposition to Soviet measures of expansion.

Problem - To determine effectiveness of US exploitation of elements of strength with object of attaining neutralization of Soviet

capabilities at least, and, at most, of obtaining active alignment with the US of forces of power in opposition to Communism in the northeast Asia complex.

Scope — This field of investigation should be in two phases — (1) identification of factors (particularly political, economic and psychological that can be brought under US control), and (2) assessment of effectiveness of exploiting these factors by various available means.

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FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Policies, objectives, capabilities of the USSR and native Communist movements in the independent [REDACTED] countries of the Far East (excluding Burma).

a. Subject — Soviet objectives and policies.

Problem — To identify objectives of Communism and methods employed in pursuit of those objectives.

Scope — Country-by-country assessments of political, economic, psychological and military methods employed by the USSR towards the end of destroying the existing governments of these areas. Particular concern should be given to Soviet and Communist tactics and strategy as they (a) are directed at decreasing existing political and social stability, and (b) employ direct Soviet attacks, the force of indigenous Communist movements, and the instrument of other Far Eastern native Communist movements (particularly Chinese).

- b. Subject — 25X6A capabilities for reorienting and communizing the independent [REDACTED] areas of the Far East (except Burma).

Problem — To estimate degree to which these areas may be caused to incline to the USSR.

Scope — Country-by-country, and where appropriate, subregional assessments of Communist capabilities for exploiting elements producing USSR-inclination and of native capacity for counteracting their vulnerabilities by controls and/or reform. Emphasis should include political, economic, psychological and military vulnerability of these areas in their independent positions and in their relationships among other nations, and capabilities for eliminating the elements of vulnerability.

2. Limitations on Communist capabilities in these areas

a. Subject - Inherent limiting factors in Communist expansion.

Problem - To identify and assess the force of factors limiting pursuit of Communist objectives.

Scope - Country-by-country studies, and several subregional studies (see below), designed to identify and evaluate the factors that impede effectiveness of Communist endeavors to reorient these areas to the USSR. These will deal with political, economic, social, religious, cultural, psychological, geographical and military (internal security) factors that limit effectiveness of Communist endeavors. Certain regional studies also should be done on Chinese participation in Far Eastern Communist movements as a limiting factor; and religion, particularly Islam and Catholicism, as limiting factors.

b. Subject - Potentials of US strength.

Problem - To assess US capabilities for attaining friendly neutrality of these areas at least, and at most their active alignment with the US as a positive force in the Western conflict with Communism consequent to existence of the foregoing limiting factors.

Scope - These studies, country-by-country and, where appropriate, areawise, should (a) identify factors of strength limiting effectiveness of Communism within each country and areawise, (b) consider alternatives available to the US, to the area and to the countries for exploiting the factors of strength and decreasing the factors of vulnerability, and (c) estimate effectiveness of various courses of coordinated action designed to strengthen the individual and collective will and ability in their opposition to Communism in concert with the West.

Area C - Areas of mixed orientation (Burma and the colonial areas of Malaya, Indonesia and Indochina).

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Soviet policies, objectives and capabilities in colonial areas and Burma.

a. Subject - Soviet objectives and policies

Problem - To identify Soviet objectives, policies and methods.

Scope - Country and area studies emphasizing Soviet methods of enticing and increasing the USSR orientation of these indecisive areas, with particular concern for identifying Soviet methods of creating and exploiting vulnerabilities, and Soviet techniques of applying direct (by the USSR) and indirect (by instruments of the USSR, as Overseas Chinese) pressure. Differences in objectives, policies and methods as they apply to different areas also should be identified.

b. Subject - Communist capabilities for orienting to the USSR areas of mixed orientation.

Problem - To assess capabilities of Communists for gaining control and USSR orientation of these areas.

Scope - Country-by-country, and where appropriate, subregional assessments of (a) vulnerability of these areas to Communist pressures, and (b) capabilities for counteracting their vulnerabilities. Emphasis should include political, economic, psychological and military (especially internal security), vulnerabilities in their independent positions and in their relationships among other nations, and capabilities for eliminating the elements of vulnerability.

2. Limitations on Communization of these areas, and US potential for strengthening the US-proclivity to a point of gaining their alignment with the US to permit availability of their resources at least, and of creating the will and ability for independent and collective active opposition to Communism, in concert with the West, at most.

a. Subject - Inherent limiting factors in Communist expansion.

Problem - To identify and assess the force of factors limiting pursuit of Communist objectives.

Scope - Country-by-country studies, and several subregional estimates, designed to identify and evaluate the factors that impede effectiveness of Communist endeavors to orient these areas to the USSR. These should deal with political, economic, social, religious, cultural, psychological, geographical and military (internal security) factors that limit effectiveness of Communist endeavors. Special concern should be given to the native characteristics and force of nationalism with particular concern for the nature of any association between nationalist movements and Communism and for factors that encourage or discourage that association. Subregional studies should include assessment of cultural homogeneity and Islam as limiting factors, and of the

interdependence of these areas among themselves and with other Far Eastern areas.

b. Subject - Potentials of US strength.

Problem - To assess effectiveness of various courses of action available to the US in the light of the foregoing limiting factors and other potentials aimed at strengthening the alignment of these areas with the US and of developing within them the will and ability for independent and collective opposition, in concert with the West, to Communism within their areas and the Far East.

Scope - These studies, country-by-country and areawise, should (a) identify factors of strength limiting effectiveness of Communism within each country and areawise, (b) consider alternatives available to the US, to the area and to the countries for exploiting the factors of Communist vulnerability, and (c) estimate effectiveness of various courses of coordinated action designed to strengthen the individual and collective will and ability in their opposition to Communism in concert with the West. Particular concern should be given to means available for exploiting nationalistic ambitions of these areas as a means of creating the will to oppose Communism, and the requirements for creating within them the ability effectively to oppose Communization within their areas and the Far East.

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GROUP II

PROSPECTS OF CHINESE COMMUNIST CONTROL OF CHINA AND NON-SOVIET AREAS OF ASIA AS
AN INDEPENDENT FORCE IN THE FAR EAST AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Policies, objectives and capabilities of Chinese Communism.

a. Subject - Chinese Communist objectives and policies in China.

Problem - To identify Chinese Communist objectives and policies for control of China.

Scope -- Estimates of the objectives of the Communist government of China. To include the basic demographic, economic, military and political considerations which determine the problems of China under any government; the theory of the "New Democracy"; the transition stage of the Chinese revolution; and the CCP's great contribution to the theory and practice of international Communism. Concern should include consideration of China's intent in relations with the USSR, and of evidence of China's subservience to or independence of the USSR, and of China's policies towards Western nations.

b. Subject - Chinese Communist objectives and policies in Asia.

Problem - To identify objectives, policies and methods of the Chinese Communist government towards the countries of Asia.

Scope -- Investigations of the intent and methods of the Chinese Communists in Asia with particular concern for their pursuance of their announced objective to aid in the Communization of Asia. Chinese methods, particularly as they employ overseas Chinese residents and manipulate native movements, should be identified. Special concern should be given to China's intent to control these governments either as an instrument of, or as independent of the USSR.

c. Subject - Capabilities of the Chinese Communist government to gain and maintain effective control of China.

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Problem - To estimate the capabilities for the Chinese Communist government to gain and retain effective control of all of China.

Scope - Studies of ability of the Chinese Communist government to gain and maintain popular support, to bring under its control the essential political, economic and military (including international security) forces, and to exploit these to a degree that, with possible accompanying Chinese effectiveness elsewhere in Asia, will create positive denial to the US of elements of strategic interest without posing a capability for independent, offensive action against US national security. Concern should include capability for independent, offensive action against US national security; also capability of the Chinese to pursue their interests (as identified in "a" above) in Manchuria, Mongolia and Sinkiang, as well as the other border areas of Tibet, the northwest and Taiwan, with special concern for any conflict of interest that may exist between China and the USSR in these areas.

d. Subject - Capabilities for the Communist government of China to aid development of Communist regions in Asia.

Problem - To estimate capability of the Chinese Communist government for bringing about creation of Communist governments in other areas of Asia.

Scope - A group of studies directed at estimating effectiveness of Chinese methods ("b", above) in creating capability for bringing Communist regions into control of other Far Eastern areas. Special concern should be given to identity and appraisal of resources available to the Chinese, and to vulnerabilities within the areas to Chinese exploitation of these resources.

2. Limitations on Chinese Communist control of China and on China's capability for aiding in creation of Communist regimes elsewhere in Asia.

a. Subject - Limiting factors in Chinese Communist consolidation of authority, control and communization of China.

Problem - To identify and estimate the force of factors that inherently limit Chinese Communist capabilities for Communization of China.

Scope - Assessment of the effectiveness of limiting factors in the Communization of China. Particularly to be considered are the nature, extent and effect of China's economic inadequacies and dependence; administrative and technical inadequacies;

factionalism; government foreign policy, particularly vis-avis the USSR, as this may create a limiting factor; resistance from forces of moderation and traditional basis for regimentation; obstruction from neighboring areas that may restrict China's success to sources of support (esp. financially) upon which China habitually has depended.

b. Subject - Limiting factors in capability of Chinese Communists for bringing about Communist regimes in other Far Eastern areas.

Problem - To identify the factors and forces in Asia that impede progress of Chinese Communists in pursuit of their announced objective to aid in Communization of Asia.

Scope - Country-by-country and area estimates of the forces in Asia that tend to or do impede Chinese endeavors to promote establishment of Communist regimes throughout Asia. Particular concern will be for political, economic, social, religious, cultural, psychological, and geographic factors. Estimate of the force of overseas Chinese should be included, and also consideration of the general anti-pathy for Chinese as a vital limiting factor.

c. Subject - Potentials for US exploitation of weaknesses.

Problem - To assess effectiveness of various courses of action available to decrease Chinese capabilities for stimulating Communism in Asia.

Scope - Studies, based on identification of factors limiting Chinese capabilities (potential US strengths) and factors favoring Chinese capabilities (local vulnerabilities), directed at setting up various courses of action available for exploiting local strengths and eliminating vulnerabilities and assessing effectiveness of these various courses of action designed to produce the will and ability for independent and collective action by these areas, in concert with the West, for preventing development of Communism in their areas. Concern should be directed primarily at eliminating weaknesses and exploiting strengths, and at creating the will and ability for native action. This will require consideration of nationalistic ambitions, economic requirements, anti-Chinese sentiment in southeast Asia, internal security capabilities, agricultural dislocations, etc. Forces of concern should be primarily political, economic and psychological. Various forms for application of military force also should be considered.

GROUP III

PROSPECTS FOR CONTINUATION OR DEVELOPMENT OF INSTABILITY IN NON-COMMUNIST AREAS,
AND IMPLICATIONS THEREOF.

(Policies and objectives supporting capabilities to be investigated and estimated within this group are the same for the USSR and China as those covered by Group I and II. Therefore, additional concern for policies and objectives required by Group III is confined to the Metropolitan Powers [REDACTED]

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Subject - Policies, objectives and capabilities of the Metropolitan Powers in their colonial areas of the Far East.

Problem - To identify and assess effect of policies, objectives and capabilities of the Metropolitan Powers in their colonial areas of the Far East.

Scope - Estimates of the nature, effectiveness, capabilities and possible consequences of the policies and activities of the Metropolitan Powers in their colonial areas of the Far East.

2. Subject - Prospects for continuation or development of instability in non-Communist areas and implications thereof.

Problem - To determine the probabilities of existence of instability that creates denial of the US of access to its strategic interests in the Far East.

Scope - Analysis of the existing causes, significance, origin and nature, and prospects for development of instability under conditions of —
Soviet instigation
Chinese Communist instigation
local native Communist instigation
indigenous political, economic and military inadequacies.

Particular concern should be devoted to methods available for neutralizing the elements of instability, whether by counter-

acting Communist instigation, by reforming internal factors producing instability, by application of external assistance, or by adjustments in international relations. Elements of instability to be considered should include political (internal and international), economic (internal and international, e.g., dependence on international trade and/or foreign economic aid), administrative and technical, military (both internal and external factors), psychological and social.

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GROUP IV

PROSPECTS FOR CREATING THE WILL AND ABILITY FOR INDIVIDUAL AND COORDINATED
OPPOSITION TO COMMUNISM BY FAR EASTERN AREAS.

(In the following it is assumed that presently - in Area A there exists neither the general will nor ability to oppose Communism; in Area B there exists the general will and a partial, though uncertain, ability; in Area C there exists an uncertain and unstable will subject to vacillation and manipulation, and a generally non-existent, though possibly, potential ability dependent on internal adjustments, external assistance, and intraregional adjustments and coordination. Considerations of policies are adequately provided in Groups I, II and III above).

Area A - Areas oriented toward the USSR (China and northern Korea).

FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

1. Subject - Prospects for developing within this area latent elements of potential resistance, and of nourishing development of new elements.

Problem - To identify elements of potential resistance and to ascertain methods of creating new forces which might counter against the Communization of these areas.

Scope - A group of investigations designed (a) to identify and assess intellectual, cultural, psychological, religious and other sources of potential resistance to the Communization of China and northern Korea, (b) to determine methods available to the West for exploiting resistance to Communization of China and Korea, and the Communists independence on outside relations, and (c) to assess the efficacy of various courses of action, both in and outside the Area, for decreasing the effective control of the Communist regimes and increasing internal opposition to the Communist rule and Communization of these areas.

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FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

1. Subject - Prospects for strengthening the US-proclivity of US-inclined areas and of increasing their ability to maintain their independence of, and to contribute to opposition of Communism in Asia.

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Problem - To assess the potential and to evaluate alternative courses of action for strengthening the will and ability of non-Communist areas to develop effective internal control of and external opposition to Communism.

Scope - A group of country-by-country, and subregional studies directed at (a) determining capabilities in terms of strengths and weaknesses in administration; political conditions; economic factors and forces; geographical location; racial, religious and population factors; internal security capabilities and external military potential; and sociological, cultural and psychological factors, (b) identifying requirements for strengthening these capabilities (as these requirements may dictate internal country action, regional action and coordination, and US participation), and (c) assessing the value of various courses of action designed to strengthen the will and increase the ability for controlling and opposing Communism.

Area C - Areas of mixed orientation.

FIELD OF INVESTIGATION

1. Subject - Prospects for creating the will and ability for individual and coordinated opposition to Communism by the colonial areas and Burma.

Problem - To determine the requirements for creating the will and ability of independent and coordinated control and opposition to Communism, and the effectiveness of various courses of action to this end.

Scope - Studies of the colonial areas will be based on assumption that

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[REDACTED] may be expected to be oriented towards the US, the native population of Indochina, Indonesia and Malaya, will be nationalistic, will prefer neutrality, and will determine their orientation according to apparent national self-interest. Inability of these colonial populations to achieve their aspirations for national identity through relations with the respective governments of France, the Netherlands, and the UK can result in their inclining to USSR-orientation." (ORE 17-49, p.7). Assuming that genuine endeavors to satisfy nationalistic ambitions of these colonial peoples is prerequisite to creation of the will to resist Communism, these studies will be concerned with the effect of various possible treatments of nationalism, and with the nature, extent and deficiencies in

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capabilities that are and may be consequent to probable developments in these areas, including the need for supporting the colonial areas in Europe and their colonial peoples in Asia. Particular concern should be devoted to estimates of requirements for creation of a capability whereby these areas could themselves exert internal control and external opposition to the communization of Asia.

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Special Regional Estimate - REGIONALISM

Far Eastern regionalism may develop either in opposition to or in support of Communist expansion. These possibilities should be examined in the following terms:

FIELDS OF INVESTIGATION

1. Subject - Potentialities for Pacific area anti-Communist joint action.

Scope - This investigation should initially assess the differences encountered in working out a Pacific Security Group as contrastive with the Atlantic Pact, considering the lack of homogeneity of population, lack of mature long-established democratic government, political heritage, economic integration, lack of geographical contiguity, and rivalry for leadership.

The paper would then give consideration to the centripetal forces, such as anti-Communism, historical and cultural ties, and common security interests.

Development of Pacific security groupings should be considered under three forms:

(a) self-initiated and Asiatic-led anti- or non-Communist regionalism, independent of western power support, and either adopting a neutral or positively anti-Communist stand; (b) the latent and actual susceptibility of non-Communist Asia and the Pacific Area to a US-induced security group with support from the UK. (The relationship of the metropolitan powers and the "former" colonial areas should be explored. Point IV and other possible US inducements would be indicated); and (c) as a substitute for a joint security grouping, the possibility of security developments on a semi-bilateral basis between the US or UK and various Asiatic/Pacific non-Communist governments with the long-run respect of one grouping brought about under the pressure of common security.

2. Subject - Communist regionalism under China's leadership.

Scope - This investigation should explore the actual advance towards formation of Communist regionalism as well as Chinese ambitions and intentions. The Chinese Communists may be expected to attempt integration - politically, economically and militarily - of those areas having Communist or Communist-dominated governments such as the Democratic People's Republic of (northern) Korea. The Chinese will exploit for purposes of communization and integration all the propaganda value in "colonialism" in Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya and to a lesser extent in Burma. The same "line" may be adopted in regard to the Republic of (southern) Korea and Japan. "Feudalism" may be exploited

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to expand influence in the Philippines and possibly Thailand. Chinese Communists will have certain economic weapons which may be exploited to assist local native parties as in Japan. Assess the potentialities of exploitation offered by Chinese colonies throughout Asia.

The full picture cannot be fully depicted without consideration of USSR reaction to the expansion of Chinese influence and without stating the stages of deterioration of US prestige and strategic influence as Communist regionalism progresses.

It may be considered necessary to consider the degree of opposition the Chinese may expect to meet in individual countries either of purely native origin or inspired by hopes or assurances of UK or US support.

Secondary Interest Projects

1. Subject - Possibility of Pan-Asianism

Scope - The ultimate development of Pan-Asianism under strictly Asiatic sponsorship, despite broad centripetal forces, cannot be anticipated for so long as the forces of Communism and anti-Communism are principal contenders for support in Asia. This investigation should be one of continuing interest although of low priority.

2. Subject - Moslem-influenced anti-Communist alliance in Asia and Middle East.

Scope - Estimate of the potential and force of the Moslem world as a force of opposition to Communism.

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APPENDIX B

POTENTIALITIES OF THE FAR EAST IN A WAR SITUATION

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In a war situation, the potentialities of any given area or region may be assessed in terms of the extent to which (a) the area needs physical and human resources, is self-sufficient in resources, or has excess resources; (b) the area needs military support, can support itself, or can also give support to others. Intelligence production on the Far East as a whole, as well as particular areas within the Far East, is planned with respect to these two major considerations. This assessment should show to what extent surplus resources in any one area may be available for supplying resource needs in other areas, and even, in a qualified manner, how far war potential in any area may be available for supporting another area. Special interest is attached to the degree to which, concretely, the Far East as a whole, as well as each particular area within the Far East, is capable of taking part in war in economic independence from, but in support of either the USSR or the US in the event of conflict between these major powers which would embrace the Far East.

In these investigations, four key area breakdowns have been made:

Area I: China proper, Manchuria, northern Korea and the Soviet Far East. Elements of this large sub-regional area of East Asia have in common the fact that they now are under either the domination or

* By a "war situation" is meant a situation, such as the present, in which the outbreak of hostilities is an ever-present threat, or an actual state of hostilities.

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the direct influence of the USSR. Subsidiary areas of investigation in this series will attempt to determine the economic integration and potential of those "Curtain" countries.

Area II: 25X6A Area designated as "Area I," [REDACTED] Elements in this sub-regional area constitute the natural complex of northeast Asia. This series will examine the consequences of any or all these countries coming 25X6A under the influence or domination of the 25X6A.

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Area III:

[REDACTED] Elements in this sub-regional grouping are at least neutral toward the 25X6A at the present 25X6A, if not friendly to it.

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[REDACTED] investigations will be made (a) to determine the extent to which the potentialities for excess resources in one or more of the countries in these areas might be made available for meeting the needs in the other countries, and to which, in this sense, the three areas together might be mutually self-supporting; and hence (b) to assess the strategic value of this combination of countries to the US in the event of war.

Area IV: The USSR-dominated area of Asia ("Area I") plus certain countries of Southeast Asia selected on the basis of "vulnerability" studies (See Appendix A-1). Individual studies will attempt to determine the net strategic gain to the USSR of selected areas of Southeast Asia and the net loss to the US.

A special regional examination of the extent to which the USSR and the US are dependent on the Far East for strategic materials is also planned.

Based on the foregoing four sub-regional area groupings and one regional field of investigation, five general fields of investigation are established. The general breakdown of investigation of these five fields is set forth hereafter.

AREA I

AREA OF PRESENT SOVIET DOMINATION OR INFLUENCE

PROBLEM: (1) To estimate the existing economic development and integration in the area comprised of China proper, Manchuria, northern Korea and the Soviet Far East, and the possibilities for further development and closer integration; and (2) to estimate the capability of this area to develop war-making potential, economically independent of European USSR and able to support the USSR in any general conflict embracing the Far East.

1. Power Capacity and Potential

Problem: To determine the existing power capacity of the area, its adequacy for current needs and the possibilities for expansion of capacity to meet the needs of a mobilized economy.

Scope: An examination of the power facilities, their adequacy for support of current economic activity, the existing area integration of the separate power systems and the possibility of expanding area capacity both by closer integration and by addition to facilities.

2. Fuel Availability and Requirements

Problem: To determine the present fuel production of the area and to assess the possibility of increasing production to meet the needs of a mobilized economy.

Scope: An analysis of current fuel requirements and additional requirements that would result from mobilization; an analysis of production and reserves, and of the condition and capacity of production installations and equipment; an assessment of the possibility of expanding output of fuels to support a mobilized economy; an analysis of the availability of substitute fuels.

3. The Strategic Materials Position

Problem: To determine the strategic materials position of the area and the degree to which area supplies are adequate or can be expanded to meet the needs of a mobilized economy.

Scope: A survey of the supply of such strategic materials position of the area and the degree to which area supplies are adequate or can be expanded to meet the needs of a mobilized economy.

4. The Food Position

Problem: To examine the food position of the area and to determine the extent to which the area can be independent of food supply from outside sources.

Scope: An analysis of production and consumption of basic foodstuffs and the extent to which surplus and deficit areas can be integrated for self-sufficiency in food.

5. Manpower Resources of the Area

Problem: To determine the adequacy of the manpower resources of the area to support a mobilized economy.

Scope: Determination of the size of the population and the labor force, the distribution of workers by occupation and industry, the possibility of expanding the labor force by immigration or other means, the maximum number of workers than can be employed in the military sector of the economy, and the availability of managerial and technical skills.

6. Existing Industrial Plant and Prospects for Industrial Development.

Problem: To examine the industrial plant in the area in order to assess present and probable future industrial potential; to identify weaknesses which exist in the present state of industrial development and which may effect the expansion of industrial output.

Scope: An appraisal of the nature, condition and capacity of industrial plant; an assessment of the degree of expansion possible; an analysis of specific or general bottlenecks to present and future output or expansion.

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7. Inland Transportation

Problem: To determine the extent to which the transportation network in the area is now or can be made adequate to support a war potential of the character indicated.

Scope: A comprehensive survey of existing railroads, waterways and roads; seasonal factors affecting their capacity; mobile equipment and facilities for maintenance; the present degree of integration of the transportation network and its adequacy to support the present economy; an estimate of the possibility, through closer integration and further development, of the network's adequacy to support a war-making potential.

8. Coastwise and Ocean Shipping

Problem: To determine the shipping tonnage currently available to the area and the possibility of augmenting shipping to meet the needs of mobilization of the economy.

Scope: An estimate of the dry cargo and tanker tonnage currently operating within and to the area; a description of the national control of this tonnage and an assessment of that part which would remain available in the event of war; an assessment of shipbuilding capacity of the area and of the availability to it of shipbuilding capacity elsewhere.

9. Existing and Possible Future Trade Patterns

Problem: To determine the amount, character, and direction of foreign and intra-area trade with particular reference to specific commodities necessary to the development and support of a mobilized economy.

Scope: An examination of the extent to which intra-area and foreign trade can eliminate weaknesses in the economy that may prevent maximum industrial output; a specific estimate of the degree to which expanded trade with European USSR may solve production problems and an estimate of the possibility of such an expansion taking place; similar estimates with regard to other areas of the Far East and the US and Western Europe.

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10. Assessment of the Area's Capabilities for War Mobilization

Problem: To assess the degree of present integration of productive factors; to assess present and potential economic development and particularly the extent to which the area is capable of supporting a mobilized economy and developing an independent war-making complex.

Scope: An analysis of the existing and potential degree of economic integration through a consideration of integration of transportation and power networks, intra-area and foreign trade, industrial patterns, and level of industrial development. The study will identify weaknesses and bottlenecks which will or may limit this potential. An estimate (quantitative, if possible) of the present and future ability to mobilize a war economy which would be economically independent of European USSR and could support the USSR in any conflict embracing the Far East.

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
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5. The Effect of the Alignment of Southern Korea with Soviet-dominated Asia upon the War-making Potential of the Whole Area.

Problem: To determine from an economic viewpoint, the advantages and disadvantages that would result from the alignment of South Korea with Soviet-dominated Asia in relationship to the area's war-making potential.

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Scope: An analysis of the South Korean economy and an assessment of the degree to which it could add to the war-making potential of Soviet-dominated Asia under the assumptions: (1) that Japan is excluded from that area, and (2) that Japan is included.

6. The Effect of the Alignment of Taiwan with Soviet-dominated Asia on the War-making Potential of the Whole Area.

Problem: To determine the economic advantages and disadvantages that would result from alignment of Taiwan with Soviet-dominated Asia with particular reference to the area's war-making potential.

Scope: An analysis of the economy of Taiwan and an assessment of the degree to which it could add to the war-making potential of Soviet-dominated Asia under the assumptions: (1) that Japan is excluded from that area, and (2) that Japan is included.


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AREA III

PRESENTLY NEUTRAL OR FRIENDLY AREAS

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25X6Alem: To determine the extent to which the area [REDACTED] is capable now or in the foreseeable future of mobilizing and supporting a war economy independent from the US but to be used in support of the US in any conflict embracing the Far East.

1. The Strategic Materials Position

Problem: To analyze the current and potential supply of strategic materials in their relationship to the area's capacity for mobilization.

Scope: A survey of the present production, the possibilities for expansion, and the present pattern of consumption of such strategic materials as rubber, fibers, petroleum, ferrous and non-ferrous alloys; an analysis of their adequacy for the support of a mobilized economy within the area.

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2. [REDACTED]

Problem: To examine the area's food position and to determine the extent to which it is or could become independent of food supplies from outside sources.

Scope: An analysis of production and consumption of basic foodstuffs on a country-by-country basis and a determination of the extent to which the area as a whole is now self-sufficient in food or can become so.

3. Manpower Resources

Problem: To determine the adequacy of the manpower resources of the area to support a mobilized economy.

Scope: A survey of manpower resources by numbers, age, sex, and occupation; an analysis of labor force and of numbers available and suitable for the armed services; a final analysis of the manpower resources as to numbers and skills (both managerial and technical) in relationship to the requirements of a mobilized economy.

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4. The Industrial Position

Problem: To determine the extent to which the present and potential industrial plant of the area can provide the industrial base for a mobilized economy.

Scope: A survey of 25X6A present and potential industrial complexes [REDACTED] an analysis of the extent to which these plants can be supported by the raw materials available domestically or in other parts of the area; an appraisal of the factors limiting industrial output of these countries and their possible combined effects which would result from attempts to expand industrial output of the whole area.

5. Intra-area and Overseas Shipping.

Problem: To determine the shipping tonnage now serving the area and to assess the shipping requirements in the event of mobilization and the possibility of their being met.

Scope: A comprehensive survey of the tonnage now serving the area as to type, nationality, and the routes on which it is employed; a study of ports, ship-building, and ship-repair facilities; an assessment of the probable changes in shipping routes and tonnage requirements that would result from an effort to maximize industrial output, with a final determination of what role the shipping factor would play in such an effort.

6. Assessment of the Capabilities for War Mobilization

Problem: To assess the degree of present integration of productive factors; to assess present and potential economic development and particularly the extent to which the area is capable of developing an independent war-making complex.

Scope: An analysis of the existing and potential degree of economic integration through a consideration of the area's integration of strategic materials, food supply, manpower resources, shipping facilities, and industry; a study of the weaknesses and bottlenecks which will or may limit the potential of the area; an estimate (quantitative, if possible) of the present and future ability of the area to mobilize a war economy which would be economically independent of the US but used in support of the US in any conflict embracing the Far East.

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AREA IV

POTENTIALLY SOVIET-DOMINATED AREAS

Problem: To appraise the degree to which the mobilization potential of Soviet-dominated Asia could be increased by the absorption of selected areas of Southeast Asia, under the assumption, (1) that Japan is excluded from Soviet-dominated Asia, (2) that Japan is included.

NOTE: Designation of the particular studies to be undertaken in this category is dependent on certain conclusions expected to be derived from preliminary work on Sub-Categories A, B, and C, as well as on regional political considerations.

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V -- Special Regional Estimate

FAR EAST STRATEGIC MATERIALS INVESTIGATIONS

Problem: To estimate the dependence of the USSR and the US respectively on the Far East to meet normal and emergency requirements for strategic raw materials.

NOTE: The project below illustrates the proposed treatment of the studies in this category. The following strategic materials may be covered in individual projects:

Strategic Minerals

Tin
Manganese
Tungsten
Molybdenum
Antimony
Graphite
Mercury
Zinc
Copper
Lead
Nickel
Bauxite
Chromium
Mica

Strategic Materials (except minerals)

Agar-agar
Fibres
Cocoanut and palm oil, sesame, rapeseed and tung oil
Rubber
Petroleum
Castor oil
Shellac

Example: The Extent of US and USSR Dependence on the Tin Resources of the Far East.

Problem: To determine the extent to which the US and the USSR is each dependent on the tin resources of the Far East.

Scope: An analysis of the normal peace-time and emergency requirements of the US and the USSR for tin; an analysis of the sources of supply of tin available to the US and the USSR; estimates of tin stockpiles available to the US and the USSR at present and a schedule of probable future tin stockpiling activities of each country; alternatives to or substitutes for tin in the industrial processes of each country; an appraisal of the extent of dependence on Far Eastern sources of tin by the US and the USSR.

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